Products
Emergency Shutdown Systems
An emergency shutdown system is defined by its shutdown functions: each trip traced from the initiating sensor through the logic solver to the final element and the required safe state. SMEC engineers those functions and their field interfaces, including bypass management, diagnostics and proof-test requirements. The required integrity follows the project hazard and risk assessment and cannot be inferred from a certified PLC.
ESD Systems Built Around the Required Safe State
An emergency shutdown system is only as dependable as its defined shutdown functions and field interfaces. SMEC's ESD engineering should trace each trip from initiating event to final element, including bypass management, diagnostics and proof-test requirements.
How it works
Safety functions — Each trip is defined from initiating sensor through logic solver to final element and required safe state.
Logic solver — Safety PLC, I/O, redundancy and segregation are chosen against the safety requirements specification and project functional safety assessment.
Operations — Bypasses, resets, trip diagnostics and maintenance access require controlled procedures.
Validation — Cause-and-effect FAT, loop checks and final-element proof testing verify implemented functions; SIL cannot be inferred from PLC certification alone.
Key components
Safety PLC/logic solver. The safety plc/logic solver is selected for the equipment, operating duty and site conditions.
ESD pushbuttons. The esd pushbuttons is selected for the equipment, operating duty and site conditions.
Shutdown valves. Valve actuation and position feedback must follow the approved process control and fail-safe philosophy, including loss-of-power behaviour.
Trip relays. The trip relays is selected for the equipment, operating duty and site conditions.
Redundancy options. The redundancy options is selected for the equipment, operating duty and site conditions.
Permissives. The permissives is selected for the equipment, operating duty and site conditions.
Cause-and-effect. The cause-and-effect is selected for the equipment, operating duty and site conditions.
Operator indication. The operator indication is selected for the equipment, operating duty and site conditions.
Historian interfaces. The historian interfaces is selected for the equipment, operating duty and site conditions.
Upgrades & retrofits
Migrate a legacy logic solver with independent functional safety review.
Improve bypass, diagnostics and proof-test documentation.
Extend SIF interfaces only following hazard assessment and SRS update.
Retrofit scope depends on existing OEM interfaces, component condition, available space, shutdown windows and the approval basis of any safety-related functions.
Applications
- Onshore production
- Refineries
- Pipelines
- Offshore platforms
Testing & documentation
Relevant IEC, ISO, API, classification-society, hazardous-area or functional-safety requirements must be selected according to the specific system and installation. Where applicable, the project package may include electrical drawings, GA layouts, datasheets, I/O schedules, cause-and-effect, communication lists, inspection records, FAT/SAT procedures, calibration records and as-built documents. No unverified compliance certification is claimed here.
Common questions
Can ESD be integrated with plant SCADA?
Status and approved commands can be interfaced while maintaining required safety independence.
Is every ESD system SIL-rated?
Not necessarily; the required integrity follows the project hazard/risk assessment.
What documentation is essential?
SRS, cause-and-effect, shutdown narratives, I/O list and applicable site standards.
Related pages
Send the requirement
Send the available drawings, specification, make and model, site and required date. An engineer reviews the scope and replies.